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Abstract:  
We applaud many aspects of E&E’s call for a descriptivist research programme in studying reasoning. 
Nevertheless, we contend that normative benchmarks are vital for understanding individual 
differences in performance. We argue that the presence of normative responses to particular 
problems by certain individuals should inspire researchers to look for converging evidence for 
analytic processing that may have a normative basis. 
Main text: 
E&E bring a timely focus to the numerous pitfalls that can arise in studying human reasoning through 
a normativist research programme. While recognising many of these pitfalls we nevertheless 
contend that normative accounts provide an invaluable reference point for understanding individual 
differences iŶ perforŵaŶĐe aŶd Ŷeed Ŷot iŶǀoke the presĐriptiǀe ŶotioŶ that people ͞ought͟ to 
reason in a particular way. Instead, we argue that normative views can usefully inform theorising 
about the cognitive processes individuals employ without necessarily limiting the nature or scope of 
the processes considered. Our recent individual differences research seems to have key points of 
contact with the descriptivist programme recommended by E&E as a counterpoint to the normativist 
one. At the same time, there appear to be important points of departure that limit our ability to 
commit fully to their pure, descriptivist vision.  Our commentary aims to explore some key points of 
alignment and non-alignment. 
To begin, we fully agree with E&E that there is a fallacy in inferring that the mere observation of 
normative responding is diagnostic of underlying analytic processing (i.e., normative responses can 
be taken neither as necessary nor sufficient in identifying analytic processing). A case in point relates 
to the phenomenon of belief bias, where, for example, normative responses to syllogisms with valid-
believable and invalid-unbelievable conclusions can provide no evidence whatsoever as to whether 
analytic processing has occurred because either a heuristic or an analytic process would give rise to 
an identical (normative) response.  Any attempt at identifying analytic strategies within this 
paradigm would need to focus on invalid-believable and valid-unbelievable conflict problems. With 
valid-unbelievable items the dominant response is normative conclusion acceptance, despite 
conclusion unbelievability. This suggests analytic processing may be occurring with such items, with 
a key proposal being that reasoners attempt to ͞disĐoŶfirŵ͟ unbelievable conclusions by searching 
for a single, counterexample model (see EǀaŶs’, 2000, Selective Processing Model – SPM). Since 
valid-unbelievable problems have no counterexample models then an analytic process would lead to 
normative conclusion acceptance. For invalid-believable problems the dominant response is non-
normative conclusion acceptance. The SPM explains this by proposing that reasoners attempt to 
͞confirm͟ believable conclusions by searching for a single supporting model, which is readily 
available. Overall, this paradigm suggests a highly nuanced picture whereby normative and non-
normative responding may arise from analytic or non-analytic processes. 
Despite interpretational difficulties, we suggest that the presence of normative responses with 
particular problems can provide researchers with a vital stimulus to search for converging evidence 
for analytic processing, and should not be ignored. For example, according to the SPM normative 
responses should never be seen for invalid-believable items, yet they do arise and it seems advisable 
for researchers to explore their underlying basis. Particularly useful in such research is the 
acquisition of fine-grained process-tracing evidence such as that derived from think-aloud protocols 
(Evans et al, 1993; Lucas & Ball, 2005) and inspection-time and eye-tracking methods (Ball et al., 
2006; Stupple & Ball, 2008; Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009).  Our recent process-tracing studies of 
belief bias reveal that individuals who give logical responses to invalid-believable conflict syllogisms 
process these problems significantly more slowly compared to non-conflict problems and to 
individuals who respond non-logically. Coupling such evidence with neuroscientific data (De Neys et 
al., 2008; Goel & Dolan, 2003) indicating the involvement of the right lateral prefrontal cortex (a 
region specialised for cognitive monitoring) in normative responding naturally leads to a view of 
individuals who respond logically to conflict problems as deploying analytic strategies sensitive to 
normative considerations.  If such evidence additionally correlates with individual-difference 
measures that are predictive of normative responding (e.g., high working memory capacity, 
generation of alternatives and need for cognition; Torrens, Thompson & Cramer, 1999) then we 
assert that such triangulation points inescapably to an association between normative responses 
and analytic processing.  
Whether or not this latter research process based around methodological triangulation is 
desĐriptiǀist uŶder E&E’s ǀieǁ is, hoǁeǀer, uŶĐlear, given the guiding role of normative 
considerations in the whole endeavour – right doǁŶ to defiŶiŶg respoŶses as ͞logiĐally ĐorreĐt͟ or 
otherwise from the outset. We acknowledge that belief bias research is not immune from issues that 
pertain to selecting an appropriate normative benchmark. Indeed, Todd and Gigerenzer (2000) have 
argued that it may not be rational to prefer logic to belief. We also agree that it is problematic to 
equate the appropriate norm with the response given by the most cognitively gifted reasoners 
(Stanovich & West, 2000). Nevertheless, we see great merit in examining the cognitive processes 
employed by such gifted individuals. Moreover, De Neys (2006) has demonstrated that reasoners 
attempt to adhere to a normative standard irrespective of their cognitive ability, which suggests that 
these standards hold some genuine descriptive value. Indeed, we have obtained preliminary data 
indicating that normative training in a matching bias paradigm (as used by Stupple & Waterhouse, 
2009) serves to increase logical responding and slow response times. Enhancements in logical 
responding have also been demonstrated with clarified quantifiers (Schmidt & Thompson, 2008) and 
training in the concept of logical necessity (Prowse-Turner & Thompson, 2009). These modifications 
to performance could be construed as merely bringing responses into closer alignment with an 
existing norm, but we would argue that there is not only merit in exploring methods of enhancing 
reasoning performance as measured against normative standards but also in examining the 
associated cognitive processes and individual differences arising from such methods.  
We therefore seek clarification as to where normativism stops and descriptivism starts. For us the 
situation seems more like a ĐoŶtiŶuuŵ thaŶ a diĐhotoŵy.  We also adŵit to ĐoŶfusioŶ oǀer E&E’s 
claim that normative standards may be legitimate in a meliorist research programme designed to 
enhance reasoning skills but are inappropriate as a benchmark in research on underlying cognitive 
processes. This seems to lead to a conundrum if we wish to examine the underlying cognitive 
processes arising in response to the interventions deployed in meliorist research. If post-
intervention responses align with normative ones then how are we to go about understanding such 
changes unless we accept that they reflect normative principles? 
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